

the varied strengths of the Departments of Treasury, State, and Energy, along with the SEC. This combined approach will mean that our efforts toward divestment are as fair, effective, targeted, and transparent as they can be. So I have proposed amending the divestment bill to that effect; a second amendment authorizes \$2 million to make this divestment task force a reality.

But whatever form they take, sanctions need to pass now. As the UN/AU force stabilizes Darfur, we must do our utmost to choke off the money that has oiled the machinery of slaughter. To those of my colleagues who are standing in the way of swift action, I ask:

What more do you need to see?

What more do we need to prove?

What more could it possibly take to move you?

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 180, as amended, and the two other strong Senate bills.

CROP INSURANCE

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, my comments here today are to point out the importance of the crop insurance program to America's farmers and America's rural communities.

Congress enacted legislation in 1980 that allowed for the expansion of the program and the involvement of the private insurance sector in the crop insurance program's delivery. Since this time, the program has grown from a small, experimental program to one that insures over 70 percent of the eligible acres in the country. In many States, an even higher percentage of the eligible acres in the State are insured. In my home State of Iowa we have over 90 percent enrollment. This protection has come to be relied on by farmers and their lenders as a vital and necessary part of farming. For most farmers their crop insurance policy is the basis of their risk management, crop marketing and loan collateral.

The success of the crop insurance program can be attributed to two key items. One is the support of the Federal Government. It is no secret that the Government supports the crop insurance program with premium subsidies that encourage farmers to purchase coverage and help pay for its cost. Additionally, rather than further increasing farmers' premium costs, the Government also pays for the delivery of the program. These Government expenditures, while not insignificant, are considerably less than the Government would likely spend in after-the-fact disaster aid if farmers didn't use the program or if the program didn't exist.

The second key item that has contributed to the success of the crop insurance program is the delivery of the program by the private insurance sector. Delivery of the crop insurance program by private companies, using local insurance agents, using modern technology, and with an incentive to do

things right and earn underwriting rewards, has allowed for market penetration that was thought impossible by many. But it has occurred, and it continues due to the quality, timely and accurate service being provided to farmers by local agents and companies.

I point out the importance of this program and its successes today, because this body is expected to consider this program during debate of the farm bill. It appears that despite successfully operating under separate legislation for years, the crop insurance program is being pulled into the farm bill discussions. The House farm bill has pulled money from the crop insurance program to offset other spending. I intend to analyze carefully the impact this House action will have on farmer's ability to manage their own risk. While I recognize there are improvements that need to be made to the program, crop insurance brings more stability to rural America.

American farmers deserve a safety net that they can count on each and every crop year. As the Senate prepares to work on our farm bill provisions, I hope we recognize that crop insurance has become ingrained into the fiber of American agriculture, from the farmers and lenders that depend on it to the rural communities whose local economies are bolstered by it in hard times.

BALLOT INTEGRITY ACT

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to address an important development in the way our votes are counted. Last November, California elected a new chief election officer—Secretary of State Debra Bowen. Secretary Bowen served in the California Legislature, where she had a reputation as a dedicated advocate for greater protections of our voting systems. Upon becoming secretary of state, she called for a “top-to-bottom” review of all voting systems used in California. This was a dynamic and appropriate step, given the heartburn that electronic voting systems have caused voters nationwide.

The problems with paperless voting systems are clear. Computers are no substitute for a paper record. We want to know where our most important documents are—and we don't leave them on the computer. Votes should be no different.

Many events over the last few years have raised great concerns about paperless voting systems. In a congressional race in Sarasota, FL, about 18,000 ballots had no recorded vote. The final vote count divided the candidates by only 300-odd votes. So-called “under-votes” occur in every election. But the rate in Florida's 13th Congressional District was unusually high. And because there was no verified paper record, we may never know who really won that election.

Some say paper ballots can malfunction or be manipulated just as easily as

these computers. I strongly disagree. When paper records fail, we can see that they have failed. If paper records are stolen, or disappear, we will notice their absence. But when malfunctions or security gaps occur in paperless voting systems, there is no easy way for voters or election officials to know that something has gone wrong. It is for this reason I support optical scan paper systems—or, at minimum, voting systems that produce a paper record verified by the voter.

So it is entirely appropriate that Secretary Bowen performed this test. Californians go to the polls in 6 months to cast their votes in the presidential primary. They must have confidence in their voting systems. With the cooperation of several voting system vendors, the University of California assembled several teams to review the systems. The teams examined the systems' source code, their physical and software defenses, and the ability of people with disabilities to use these systems. The systems fell short in all three tests. In a short span of time, computer scientists identified a number of major vulnerabilities with the voting systems. And these experts were able to hack the vote in less than 5 weeks.

It is important to note that many election officials employ security measures to protect their systems from these kinds of attacks. In this test, the focus was on the voting system's defenses alone—no external protections were employed. Even without such protections, the results of this examination clearly indicate we need to improve these systems.

A few examples of what the University of California experts were able to do: First, researchers were able to gain access to the internal computer system by breaking or bypassing the locks in the voting systems. In the case of one voting system, ordinary office objects were used to gain access. Second, researchers were able to replace existing software with a new, corrupt virus that fed incorrect election data to the system. This attack used a program that appeared to change the text, but instead replaced the original software with corrupted code. Many small jurisdictions may lack the technical ability to identify and protect against these attacks. Third, while election officials can test these systems, experts noted that software distinguishes between election mode and testing mode. This could allow a virus to instruct the system to run properly during a test—but allow it to be corrupted during an election. Even counties that test their systems often could be vulnerable. Finally, the team was able to develop a device that would allow unauthorized access—and allow someone wishing to corrupt the ballot box to change the system's vote count.

What does all this mean for elections in the United States?

It means we should follow the lead of Secretary Bowen, and take a very